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Allen

March 24, 1962

MR. DULLES - ERIC SEVAREID

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CONFIDENTIAL

MACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

ERIC SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, you come from a family very much identified with government and public service. What was your own first excursion into public affairs?

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MR. DULLES:

Eric, that really goes back to over a half century. sixty years, in fact. In those days, when I was eight or nine years old, I was living to the time in Washington. My grandfather, John W. Foster, was living here and my uncle, Robert Lansing. My grandfather had no sons. He had two daughters. My mother and Mrs. Lansing and he got unusually fond of Foster and me and used to like to have us come down there to Washington--- I mean, it was an excitement as a boy to come down there and so I was down there a great deal and I used to sit in on the discussions between my grandfather and my uncle particularly in the days of the Bear War. I remember very clearly those days when I was down here. I had a Great-uncle who was ambassador to London on my father's side. John Welch. My middle name is Welch, so I've been

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MILLES CONTINUED:

brought in touch with---I've been very close to people that have been in the foreign field for many years.

BEVAREID:

When you were a small boy, I'm told, you intervened in the Boer War with the British?

MILLES:

Well, that's a little---Kris, I think that's a little exaggeration, but I---I wrote what they call a book. It was a little pamphlet [buzzer] I wasn't intended as anything at all, but I used to sit down in the evenings to dinner, you know and not knowing very much about all this and I would hear my grandfather and my uncle debating the issue of the Boer War. One was of British stock and one was of Dutch stock and they took very, very vigorous, antagonistic positions and they--- the debate waxed hot and so that was the basic source of my information and I had two other sources. I had the Washington Post and the book by Conan Doyle. I don't think most people realized that Conan Doyle, in addition to writing **SHERLOCK HOLMES** and detective stories, wrote a book called **THE GREAT BOER WAR**. My

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DULLS CONTINUED:

little book was only called THE BOER WAR.

SEVAREID:

Is this the book you wrote at the age of eight, I'm told?

DULLS:

Yes, first ~~edit~~ edition came out when I was eight.

SEVAREID:

Why did you---why did you choose the side of the Boers? Was the Dutch side of your family influenced a little stronger?

DULLS:

No, no---I think quite the other way. Well, when you're young, I think you're inclined to go for the underdog. I mean, I just felt---I'd known what bullies were in school and so forth and so on and I don't mean that the British were bullies, but that---they were the strong powerful country and the Boers seemed the---the weak country, so I think I went for the Boers for that reason.

SEVAREID:

Well now, you had a grandfather, an uncle and then your brother Fester---

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DULLES:

That's Right.

SEVAREID:

All Secretaries of State. You were pretty much pressed for government service, weren't you, Mr. Dulles, at a very early age?

DULLES:

Well, I was---yes. I---wasn't quite sure what I was going to do when I graduated from college. I was the member of the last class in Princeton to graduate out into what one might call the post-Victorian, pre-World War I world. I graduated in June, 1914, two or three months before the outbreak of the first World War and I was---as I graduated, I was wondering what to do and I ran into a very extraordinary fellow at my graduation. He was about---oh, ten or twelve years ahead of me at Princeton. A sort of a precursor of the Peace Corps. He had gone to India with a missionary college there and had organized one of the first agricultural schools, a sophisticated agricultural school, using American methods that had been organized in India and it had a great reputation there and that graduation, I happened to be

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DALLES CONTINUED:

in with him and he enthused me at the idea of---of going to India and told me if I'd stay three years, they'd pay my way out and back. ^{IF} I stayed only one year, I'd have to pay my way back and I had the large salary of five hundred dollars a year, which was---went quite far in those days, so I went out for one year and taught school in India.

BEVAREID:

Were you in Princeton, Mr. Dalles, at the same time with your brother Foster?

DALLES:

No, he graduated just before I entered. He graduated in 1908. He was six years ahead of me.

BEVAREID:

So you were not in prep school then either with him-----

DALLES:

No---no, we weren't in prep school together. Except that we spent a year together in Paris. He, just after his graduation in 1908---the fall of 1908---he went to the Sorbonne for a year and I went to the which interestingly enough school that Chris Harter went

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DULLES CONTINUED:

to. You may have---you may recall, Eric---

SEVAREID:

Yes---

DULLES:

---that he went to the DC
was doing work, final preparation for college and he
doing post college work in the Sorbonna.

SEVAREID:

Well, were you and Foster great rivals as boys, or was
the age gap too big for that?

DULLES:

A little of both. We were great rivals. We were great
rivals in fishing---

SEVAREID:

Never had fights?

DULLES:

Oh yes---not---at that time, I was ^{R's} quite in the class
having a fish fight, or anything of that kind with him
but, not---not---not really very serious, you know.
would have great contests in fishing. We would go out
fishing. One would go with Mr. Lansing and one would

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DULLES CONTINUED:

go with John W. Foster, my uncle and grandfather and then we'd count the number of black bass, small mouth black bass we got and that was fascinating, you know that went on for years---well, until my brother went to college and he was---he went to college at fifteen. Pretty young. I went to college at sixteen.

SEVAREID:

Who was the better fisherman?

DULLES:

Well, that I will not admit today. I think I was---I think I was a better fisherman than he was, but very close going.

SEVAREID:

You were more of an athlete than Foster, weren't you?

DULLES:

No---no---about the same. In Tennis we were about the same till he had to stop on account of his back. Golf---I think I was a stroke or two better. We used to play a great deal of golf and tennis in the days until he had that little trouble with his leg back in '44 and he had to---they told him to stop.

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SEVAREID:

Well, actually your first work almost in public service in World War I was in intelligence work, was it not? Can you tell me a little bit about that World War I period what you accomplished?

DULLES:

After I got back from this trip to India and worked my way around the world, reaching school---I went and taught school in China too. I came back to the United States, took a post graduate degree at Princeton in international and---international law, constitutional law. Because in college, I'd specialized in philosophy, so I wanted to get that back ground too and then I took the examination for the foreign service and I luckily passed then and this was in 1916 and then I was assigned to Vienna. But at that time came a little incident that might have decided my career in a different way. I was a member of the Company L of the New Jersey Militia, National Guard and I---at that time, had a call, or my company had a call to go down to the Mexican border. Remember 1916? We had the problem down there and I received that call the same time I got a designation to enter the

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WILLES CONTINUED:

diplomatic service and go to Vienna, so I really said to Uncle Sam, "You decide. You think I'm a better diplomat or a soldier?" I never rose above the rank of private therefore in the Army and I want to---I want to Vienna.

SEWARD:

Well, what did you actually do in World War I?

WILLES:

Well, in Vienna, we had a great deal of work there as we represented, for the few months we were there, we represented the interests of the British, the French and the others who had broken relations and were at war with Austria-Hungary. That involved a great deal of work. Then, later, when Austria-Hungary broke with the United States, you may recall---after we went to war with Germany in April of 1917, pressure was brought to bear on the Austro-Hungarian government by Berlin and they were practically forced to---to break relations with the United States. We tried to avoid that and very interesting negotiations that will be written up someday, probably that particular period when we tried to retain relation with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (buzzer) while---while fighting the Kaiser.

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SEVAREID:

Well, were you involved in that in any kind of a high level way, or---

WILLIAMS:

Well, not a high level way, but I was involved in it that I saw all the messages. I was consulted on certain phases of it. I knew what was going on. The negotiations were carried on by the Ambassador and later by Joe Green, who came down to Austria.

SEVAREID:

Well, you've really been around the exercise of power ever since your very, very early years. It never seemed strange to you I suppose? Most of us are a little intimidated by power in big government?

WILLIAMS:

Well, I wonder how you define power in that way? I mean I was in--ever in those early years, I was close to and knew the--many of the great figures, or the ^{has} who were making decisions that certainly/affected our world right today and as I think back to those days, you know--World War I--that could have been avoided. The whole history of the world might have changed and you

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DULLES CONTINUED:

look back to the decisions that the Kaiser made. Interestingly enough, his intelligence officers---so many of these decisions were made on the basis of a false estimate of the world situation. Would England go to war, or would England not go to war? Those issues were being decided in those days.

SEVAREID:

Did we have any kind of intelligence service at all then?

DULLES:

Well, we had the---our diplomatic service. We had in those days, as now, a very able career diplomats, who advised the country quite wisely as to what was going on. We did not have what one would technically call an intelligence service. Other than the service that the Army and the Navy then had in support of possible military operations.

SEVAREID:

Do you think that the Kaiser, the "Hitler" of those days in a sense, understood America and what we would do?

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DULLES:

Eric, you know, if you read history and I've been reviewing since I've retired---I've been---had a little more time to read on this. As far as I can see, the--- neither the Kaiser in 1914, nor Hitler in 1939, when he was---or they, were planning on war, took any account of the position that the United States Government might take in the struggle. They didn't---as far as the records show, they didn't sit down and say, "Well, if the United States comes in, how will that change the balance? Will the United States come in?" We were practically ignored as a power in world affairs and yet the practical situation is that we played a vital role in deciding each one of those issues.

STAVROPOULOS:

Well, if they had assumed early on that the United States might come in---do you think either war might have occurred?

WILLIAMS:

I think that if they had been certain that the United States was going to come in, neither war would have occurred. Now, there's some little question as to World War I, because our military position was awfully weak at that

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DULLES CONTINUED:

time. We built up something of a navy, but our military position was not strong, but I think that if the Kaiser and Hitler had realized that we would intervene at the outset, I doubt whether either war would have occurred.

BRYAREID:

Well, you came of age really and right in the middle of affairs, at the great turning point of America's entrance into world affairs, particularly European affairs. Do you share the feeling of some that if we had joined the League of Nations after World War I, that World War II would have been avoided?

WILLES:

That---it's hard to decide that. I think to answer that you can't decide it with a clearcut yes, or no, because while we were not a member of the League, we were, in 1939 and prior to that, we were co-operating with the League in a great many of its activities that related to---well, to our problems. For example, over all the years, we were a member of the conference on limitation of armament---the reduction and limitation of armament as they called it then and I in fact attended as a leg

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DULLES CONTINUED:

advisor to Norman Davis and other capacities in most of these conferences, so that we were beginning to take our weight felt in world councils, but, as I mentioned before, there was no idea that the outbreak of a general war would bring us in. If we--if we had been in the League, with the various in the League, we would have had certain legal obligations with respect to the war that we did not have as it was.

NEWARK:

I think you were at the Versailles peace treaty conference. Did you ever have anything to do with President Wilson?

DULLES:

I knew President Wilson for really quite a long while before the peace conference. I was a freshman at Princeton when he was President. Then, as you recall, he became Governor of New Jersey and then President and I remember as a junior in college, I paraded up Pennsylvania Avenue in the inaugural--inaugural parade.

NEWARK:

Were you a Democrat in those days?

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HILLIS:

No, I was a Republican, but I've always been a great believer in Woodrow Wilson. I think he made certain mistakes, but I think he's one of the great men of American history. When the peace conference started, in December of 1918, I was designated to Paris to join the American peace delegation there in Paris and the first job I did on the protocol for Woodrow Wilson's arrival in Paris--I think it was the 16th of December, 1918 and I was working then with my great friend and neighbor, Bob Hill, who was in charge of that. From that time on, I was a relatively young man, I was pretty active at the peace conference. I know Woodrow Hill as well.

SPENCER:

Somebody told me--

HILLIS:

Why I go back just now--just one other point--I was with him around. As he arrived in Paris, the American Foreigner, has ever received a reception on French soil that Woodrow Wilson received at that time. It was a thrilling day. Self-determination, the fourteen points

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DULLES CONTINUED:

had a great deal to do with ending the war and he was -
he was the prophet of self-determination there and the
countries that had been under what they considered
alien domination. Of course, all those people - but
it swept Europe, it swept Europe.

SEWARD:

Do you think that proclamation of his was perhaps the
greatest propaganda stroke, if that's the word, about
this country's ever

DULLES:

Yes, I think that the greatest operation of culture
culture was the whole negotiation leading up to the
Armistice of November 11, 1918. Self-determination was
one element. The idea that the peace would be on the
basis of the fourteen points was another element. The
extraordinary exchange of correspondence that passed
between Wilson and Prince Max of Baden, the new German
the German Chancellor. The whole thing led to a
situation where the German internal front no longer
supported the war, but then there was one element
lacking it. The of what was going on

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WILKES CONTINUED:

In Moscow. True, the Soviet---the Russians had left the war at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and slightly before and that had allowed the Germans to move their forces from the east front to the west front, but still the growth of Communism and the affect that communism was having even in Germany, was an element which added to---a sinister element which was added to this great propaganda move of Wilsons, which broke down---really broke down the home front in Germany.

BEVANSID:

Do you have any feeling that we brought World War II to unconditional and end in a wrong way? That ~~unconditional~~ surrender prolonged it, or was a mistake?

WILKES:

unconditional
I've always been against ~~unconditional~~ surrender and wrote against it soon fifteen years ago. I was against it because in reality, it is a meaningless term.

BEVANSID:

There are always conditions?

WILKES:

You always have conditions. I worked a bit on the

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DULLES CONTINUED:

writing of the conditions for ending the---for the
surrender in North Italy that I worked on. As I recall,
it took sixteen pages single spaced, to spell out your
unconditional surrender, so that it---it's quite---
it's quite meaningless and I think it gave Goebbels
really his great propaganda weapon. He said to the
Germans, "You have no choice. There is no terms of
peace. You have no honorable surrender."

SEVAREID:

In other words, it prolonged the fighting?

DULLES:

Well yes, I think the Wilsonian tactics in World
War I were preferable to the tactics imposed to some
extent by our relationship with the Russians, of World
War II.

SEVAREID:

Why do you think President Roosevelt made that statement?

DULLES:

I don't know. I was in Switzerland at the time and I
was not in close touch with what was going on. I think
it was in part because of the charges that were being

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DULLES CONTINUED:

made, or the suspicion that was engendered that if a chance came, we would throw the Russians---I mean, we would scrap the Russian alliance and go ahead on our own and I think it was largely in part, at least, in order to assuage that.

SEVAREID:

To pacify Russian suspicions?

DULLES:

That's right.

SEVAREID:

When looking back, that seems an awful mistake in attitude now, doesn't it?

DULLES:

It does.

SEVAREID:

In World War I, I understand you---

[HOLD UP]

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, in World War I, you were in Switzerland, I think, as you were in World War II. Is it true that

BACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN

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SEVAREID CONTINUED:

you had a chance to meet Lenin and missed the opportunity

DULLES:

I may be a little sorry you brought this up. I'm always a little ashamed of this Eric, but I did, or rather, I did not. I was in Switzerland [BUZZER] in March, 1917. At that time---[BUZZER] it was just before I was assigned there more or less permanently and just before the break with Austria, I'd gone there to pick up the mail. There were twenty odd pouches of mail that normally went over went over Germany to Austria. Then, due to the break with Germany, they sent them to Switzerland and I was there at the time and I spent several days of holiday there in Switzerland and one of the members of the American legation, as it then was in Switzerland, told me about this Russian who was an exiled refugee, who was living in Switzerland and said---I think he was in Zurich at the time---and said he was going over to see him, that he had open house, that anybody could talk to him, that he had some new theories, quite novel theories and asked whether I wouldn't go with him

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DULLES CONTINUED:

AND I said, "Well, you go and tell me about it. I think I'll go and play tennis." I learned a lesson Eric. I learned a lesson---

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, I learned a lesson too in 1941 in the Lowland Army maneuvers, a colleague asked me to go up the road and have a talk with an American army officer called Colonel Eisenhower and I didn't bother. I want to--- well---

DULLES:

You understand. All I can say is I learned a lesson, I think. I've seen a lot of strange people since and on the whole. I've profited by it.

SEVAREID:

How many languages do you speak, Mr. Dulles?

DULLES:

Other than English, which I don't speak as well as I would like, but I speak French and German. My German is a little rusty now, but my French is still---still good.

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SEVAREID:

You went back into foreign service and you stayed in it a while, until the twenties and why did you quit? You quit with a rather dramatic gesture, as I remember?

DULLES:

Well, I felt at the time, that it was unfortunate that the salary scale was so low that unless you had substantial financial means, you couldn't go into the diplomatic consular service. It was a little different than the ~~manufacture~~ service. At that time, you may recall, we did not have a united foreign service. We had a diplomatic service and a consular service. Now, that was changed about 1923-24. The Rodgers Act. I resigned because at that time, I had two rather small children and two daughters and I had practically no outside means and I felt that I ought to make enough money to educate them.

SEVAREID:

How did you go about acquiring the money?

DULLES:

Requiring the money?

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SEWARD:

Acquiring the money?

DILLIS:

Well, I had an offer---came through my brother, to join him in the practice of the law and I joined the law firm of Sullivan and Crosswell in 1926 and stayed there with them until World War II broke out, with certain leaves of absence that they gave me during the period of the late twenties and early thirties to work on disarmament in Geneva. I attended all those disarmament conferences really from '25 when I was in the service, to '33.

SEWARD:

When you quit the foreign service itself, you let out a blast, I believe, about the poor salaries. Did this do any good? Do you think the salaries are high enough now?

DILLIS:

Well, I consulted very able public relations people and they said if you want to get something published, get it out on a Monday. I don't know whether that's true any more, so I wrote a letter to Secretary Kellogg and

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DULLES CONTINUED:

with his full approval, I released it to the press and I got the front page of the New York Times on Monday morning so I guess my advice given me was good.

SEVAREID:

This was a protest about the salary?

DULLES:

Well, it wasn't a protest. It merely said, "Dear Mr. Kellogg: With great regret, I have to tender you my resignation, as I feel that I have to get out in order to make money to---make enough money to educate my children and so forth and so on [BUZZER]---

SEVAREID:

Well, do you think our professional diplomats are paid enough now, or is it still too much a necessity for wealthy men to go into it?

DULLES:

Well, I think that they ought to get a larger post allowances. The actual salaries that they get, while they are not in line with what one gets in business, they are in line and in fact, a little above the salaries one

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DULLES CONTINUED:

gets in government. In fact, I believe that an Ambassador up to the first grade, get more than a cabinet officer, but they do not get the funds to do the necessary things as far as entertainment, living quarters, housing and everything of that kind, so I think it could be corrected I think it should be corrected. I think there ought to be liberal allowances, possibly with a full accounting for it, as to how it is spent, so that they will not have to go into their own pockets in order to do the-the entertaining that is necessary to meet their positions and in some cases, great financial responsibility is put on them by all the visitors who come. The whole Congress travels all the time and I gather from the paper as I was reading the news, they have to be right down at the station.

LEVARRID:

Mr. Dulles, you put in a good many years now--I think nine, as head of the C.I.A. You really have built C.I.A. How did you put in a typical day? What does a so-called "master spy" do outside of the substance of your work

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SEVAREID CONTINUED:

which you---you can't talk about? How did you start your day? What was it like from hour to hour?

DULLAS:

Well, first Eric, I'd like to modify one of your statements I had a part in the building of the C.I.A., but I'd like to go back a little further and recognize the perfectly extraordinary job that a great American, Bill Donovan during World War II, in organizing the---what one might call the foster parent of the C.I.A., the O.S.S. and I had the great honor and pleasure of working with him, of course, during those years, particularly during my assignment to Switzerland. Then my predecessor, Walter "Beetle" Smith "Beetle" Smith did a very extraordinary job there in the relatively short time he was there. I remember his calling me up in New York and almost giving me orders to come down to Washington and---and work with him for six weeks in---considering putting into effect a report that a small committee of us had made at Truman's request about eight months before.

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JACK ODD, ROSSI EVEN CPYRGHT

SEVAREID:

This was for the permanent C.I.A.?

MILLES:

Yes. This report was made at President Truman's request during the year 19⁴⁸ and then we didn't know who the report would be submitted to---

SEVAREID:

1918? You mean---

MILLES:

I mean 1948, excuse me. 1948 and we submitted the report at the end of the year 1948---Truman had just been reelected and he submitted the report to the National Security Council and then certain action was taken. When "Baerlin" called me up, he wanted me to come down with Phil Jackson and Matt (Koraa?), the other two members of the committee lawyers from New York and going through the suggested changes to be made, put the report into effect. I came down for six weeks. I stayed eleven years.

SEVAREID:

Hell, how does a man go about setting up a vast espionage intelligence operation? Who do you turn to? How do you know who to trust?

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DULLKS:

Well, that's---that's not an easy question. Let me say in the first place that too much emphasis is put by the general public on what they believe is sort of tradition espionage; people rushing around and stealing people's papers and getting information in that way. Not very much information is got in that way. Information is collected by developing the appropriate kind of contacts with people who know what is going on, gaining their confidence and I don't mean gaining their confidence in a way that you steal information from them by indiscretion particularly, but just getting to know what a lot of people know and that requires choosing the appropriate kind of people who can do that, making contacts on a world-wide basis, so that in a country like Korea, you know ^{not} only what Rhee is thinking, but you know what someone who thinks Rhee isn't doing quite the right thing is thinking. I could go on on this question for a long while, but you'd better---maybe you'd better ask questions. Otherwise I'll get off--- I'll get off the track.

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SEVAREID:

I'm trying to think how to prod you here. We'll get back into the C.I.A. somewhat later.

DOLLES:

Maybe if you ask a specific question on a specific type of operation?

SEVAREID:

I will when we get into that Alien---

DOLLES:

Right.

SEVAREID:

---but before we miss it entirely---

DOLLES:

No.

SEVAREID:

---I'd like to go back to your work in World War II in Switzerland. You went to Switzerland for Mr. Donovan, I take it--the O.S.S. in 1942. How did you get in?

DOLLES:

By the skin of my teeth.

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SEVAREID:

How do you mean?

DILLERS:

[LAURENTER] I---applies for visas to go perfectly normal as a special advisor to the American Minister, Leland Harrison in Switzerland. Those applications went through the normal state department channels and required visas from Portugal, Spain and Vichy France. Vichy France was still open. I had quite a little difficulty just at that moment getting a Spanish visa. I got the other two visas quite quickly, but the Spanish visa was held up, so that I left New York---I think it was on the second of November, 1942 and when I left, I knew and I was one of the few that knew, that the Anglo-American ---the American-British Expedition to North Africa was already at sea. It was moving. One didn't know within twenty-four hours, or forty-eight hours when it would arrive, but I knew that the arrival of that fleet would about coincide with the time I'd be at the Swiss frontier or in Vichy France.

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SEVANKID:

You crossed Vichy France on the ground?

DULLES:

I crossed Vichy France on the ground. I was held up by weather in the Azores. That was in the old days, you remember, the flying ships and if it was rough in the Azores, you didn't get on until it was smooth enough to take off and I felt that day was going to probably make me too late. I went on ^{to} Portugal---I went on as far as I could across Spain by air to Barcelona---went up to the frontier at Port on the French-Spanish frontier and I was sitting there having lunch with a Swiss friend whom I happened to meet on the train---a Swiss courier came up to him and said, "Have you heard the news? The Americans and the British have landed in North Africa?" Well, I sat there. Should I go on, or should I turn back? We had assumed that as soon Hitler had the word of the invasion, he would have to move and take over the---the Vichy France on account of the ports. He had to have the ports on the Mediterranean and so forth and so on.

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HEVAREID:

Well, he did.

MILLES:

Which he did, but how soon was he going to do it? He was already up in the north---on the north of Lake Geneva and to get some armored forces down would be a matter of hours. It wasn't a question of days if he moved, and as I sat there on the Spanish frontier, I--- I just wondered---shall I go, or shall I go back? And--- well, I decided to go and I went across the on the French side of the frontier and the city there was in fate. They expected the American liberating troops to be there tomorrow you know---here they were just across the sea in Africa and fated there---I was given a tremendous reception. Also I happened to have a bottle of cognac. It was the only---they had had strict censorship---not censorship---a strict control on liquor, so we all gathered there in the station I was very well at and we consumed the bottle of cognac in celebration of the landing. Then I got on the train.

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STEWART:

Did those people know who you were?

ROSSI:

They knew I was an American---that was all. They knew I was an American on the way to Switzerland. They didn't know my name had that.

STEWART:

Then, how did you get across---into the Swiss---over the Swiss border?

ROSSI:

I went by train---took the and went about Lyon and then as I got near the Swiss frontier at Annemasse---the last few minutes before I got there I got the car time and waited to see whether the train had moved in---the Nazis had moved in, because if they had, I was not going to go ahead on the train, because I knew I'd be stopped when I got to Annemasse---got to Annemasse all right. He had been briefed on what to expect there before I left; that there would be a certain man who would be there supervising the passport control. So, as I put in my passport---as I went along the---the

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CPYRGHT

DULLES CONTINUED:

French gendarmes were there and they took my passport and then they passed it over their shoulder to this sort of sinister looking guy behind who was the---

EVANKID:

A German?

DULLES:

A German---why, he looked a German and he was a German. He was a member of one of those German secret services, either---probably Himmler's Gestapo and he handed this paper back and I thought maybe I was all right, but then the head of the gendarmerie came up and said he was very sorry to tell me, that orders had just been received from Vichy to detain all Americans and British there. I made the most eloquent speech. I got him in a corner and made the most eloquent speech I think I ever made in my life. I evoked the shades of Lafayette and to Pershing and the American-French friendship over the years and how we worked together and I almost had him in tears. I was in tears myself with my eloquence and he said, "Well, I'll see what I can. We'll telephone t

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BULLS CONTINUED:

Vichy." "Why," I said, "I don't think Vichy's going to be very much interested in us today. I think its got other things to do, because of course Petain had his hands full on that particular day." [BUZZER] because the move into France---Southern France was already on and well, they said, "No, you wait." so I waited and waited. Finally, the train was to leave at half past twelve. It was twelve fifteen and finally I went to this man and said, "I'm not going to wait any longer. Where's my passport? I want my passport and I'll leave." "Well," he said, "Wait just a minute, your passport's in the hands of one of the French officials up the street." So we went up---I'm afraid I'm giving you too much detail.

BEWAREKID:

Go ahead.

BULLS:

We---we went down the street of Annamasse and as we went down, he said, "Ah, there's---there's the man who has your passport." and the Frenchman came up to me. I wish I knew who he was. I don't. He was in the prefecture the

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DOLLER CONTINUED:

And he handed me my passport and he said this in French,
"....."
which means "Go ahead." I was just--only symbolic and
he gave me the passport back. They shoved me on the
train, never looked to see what I had in my baggage. I
was careful not to take any papers. I had only money
and goods. All my papers had gone a different way. I
got over. The last American to enter France before the--

SEVAREID:

Switzerland you mean?

DOLLER:

Enter Switzerland before--

SEVAREID:

And that is how--that is how you set up that fantastic
operation in Switzerland then in the latter part of
World War II. Now, in those years--you were in Berna--
was it?

DOLLER:

Well, I was in Berna, but I also had places where I could
live securely in--in other places in Switzerland, such

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DULLES CONTINUED:

as Zurich and Geneva and on the Italian frontier.

ALVAREZ:

Well, from there on, the story of your work becomes a rather dramatic part of history. Your connection with the Germans working on the bomb plot against Hitler. The surrender of the Germans in Italy. The discovery of that German V-2 rocket base at Peenemunde. How did you set about making your first contacts once you got to Switzerland?

DULLES:

Eric, I think in a sense, I was lucky in that I had to scrape around myself and I couldn't call on a great force to come and join me from the United States. Maybe that is a little ambiguous, but I--I didn't get cluttered up with the bureaucracy of a large organization, because until the frontier opened up two years later, no Americans could join us there and work there, because no Americans could come legally into Switzerland. Some would come in by parachuting into France and then moving over, but they could not work with us and so I had to use my inge-

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DULLES CONTINUED:

as best I could and try to find people with whom I could-
 could work. I wrote a book about it in 1947, just about
 one phase of it, just about my work with the German
 underground and the plot against Hitler. There was a
 man named Von G..... who was an American
 whose father had been a liberal, a professor---a member
 of the Reichstag after World War I [BUZZER]---and I had
 known him when I was in Berlin in 1920 and other people
 ---I had to work with a good many farmers and there---
 there was from the very beginning, a group of Germans
 who never contended to Hitler, who were opposed to him
 from the beginning for ideological and other reasons
 and working through them, it was very helpful. Now,
 working in the other direction, because my problem was
 not only working with respect to Germany, but also with
 respect to Austria, which was a part of Germany, but
 you know their differences. Italy---Fascist Italy
 under Mussolini and France---so I was in touch with
 many of the French underground, with the Italian
 underground, with the Austrian underground, as well as
 the German underground.

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SEVAREID:

Well, the Germans had no illusions as to what you
doing, did they? They knew who you were?

WILLIS:

No, they had no illusions as to what I was doing
there comes a point that---on which I've been criticized
somewhat and I understand the criticism. I found
my work in Switzerland that I was going to get a
deal more information in view of the situation of
disaffected peoples in these---all these other countries
if they knew where to go than if I went wholly secret.
Now, that means I was fairly well known, except
(General-Genavet) wrote an article which said that
was a special envoy of President Roosevelt. That
not true. The more I denied it, the more it was
but it was generally known that I was there to
organize and therefore, a great many people came to
never would have known otherwise where to go.
If you're carrying on operations, you've got to use
every sophistication of secrecy that is possible
to keep those operations secret, but if you want to

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DILLER CONTINUED:

information, somebody's got to know if they have secret information, where to bring it. So, I've always found in here---I've always found---don't try to hide things that you can't hide, but those things that can be kept secret and must be kept secret, use every sophistication to keep them secret.

SEVAREID:

Well then---

DILLER:

A lot of people say I ought to bury this building that I built up here on the---

SEVAREID:

Yes---

DILLER:

---told them it's not mine anymore, but I can see the idea. It was a terrible thing to put a sign out that that's the C.I.A. Well, I put those signs up because they all---the vehicles going out there and all the trucks and so forth---they didn't know the way, so they had to know the way---you have to build a building.

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SEVAREID:

They usually found out even if---

GULLIES:

And no matter what you do, your building will be found out. We know all the buildings of the secret services of the other countries. There are certain things you can't keep secret and the more you make a mystery out of it---the early days when I was---I was director of Central Intelligence---just after President Eisenhower was inaugurated that I had an appointment with Milton Eisenhower and so the President said, "I'll take you over there." They couldn't find the place. There was no sign up. They couldn't find the place, so I put sign up.

SEVAREID:

The old building?

GULLIES:

The old building here---yes.

SEVAREID:

The President was trying to find it himself?

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DULLES:

Yes...he was trying to find it. Yes. [LAUGHTER]

SEVAREID:

That really was a secret operation.

DULLES:

Well, as a matter of fact, it wasn't secret. I found out that all the rubberneck wagons, you know, that go around with the tourists to see sights---they were deliberately stopping in front of this barbed wire, where there was no sign up other than government printing offices, or something of this kind and they'd say, "Right in there is the most secret building in the United States. That's the spy center of the United States." As soon as a post a sign up, they'd go by it. "There's the Central Intelligence Agency. There's the State Department. There's the Whitehouse." but---

SEVAREID:

You remove the mystery, it's not so attractive!

DULLES:

If you remove the mystery, there's very little interest in it. And I'm afraid I got you way off the track on this one.

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SEVANKID:

Well, pleasantly so. Mr. Dulles, while you were in Switzerland in World War II, would it be fair to say then, that through your efforts, this government here knew about the plots against Hitler's life as they developed?

DULLES:

They knew about the--the last plot. I did not have the details of some of the earlier plots. Some of the poor place before I was in Switzerland--the Beer Hall Plot and so forth took place, of course, long--long before I was in Switzerland. I did have the details of the last and most serious plot that almost succeeded on the 20th of July, 1944 and a German who was working with (Kasavicius?) who was head of the German they called it, the counter intelligence service, but really was their military intelligence.

SEVANKID:

Hans (Kasavicius?)?

DULLES:

Hans (Kasavicius?) yes. He kept me informed of the on

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DULLERS CONTINUED:

and he went up, at the risk of his life, because he thought he was suspect to the Himmler---and took part in the plot. Before he left, he left me a long memorandum about which I reported to Washington a week before the plot took place. It came very close to succeeding. If Hitler, as he went by---Hitler was having a briefing at the time. He was up on the East Front---in East Prussia and he was having his regular morning briefing and (Stautonbur) who had the bomb, was in the room. He was---he had a special message for Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It was a---you know, one of these long tables that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it down near---on the leg nearest to where Hitler was. There was a long map, twenty feet or more long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front and so forth and so on. Hitler was being briefed there and just before the bomb went off, Hitler went off here to see how the front was, let's say in Pinsk and that took him ten feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and

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ODD, ROSSI EVEN

CPYRGHT

DULLES CONTINUED:

He was blown out of the building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack---it was just a barracks there.

BRVARSID:

Well, nobody could predict his movements to that fine degree?

DULLES:

No to twenty feet. No.

BRVARSID:

It must have been a great disappointment to you and everyone else?

DULLES:

I remember waiting to see whether---they would get a hold of a radio that day and they never got hold of a radio. You know, that's one of the modern revolutions---one of the great things to note is---had they got control of the radio and again and again as I've sat back, either---when revolutions were---were upcoming, the indicators to you as to whether one side or the other is winning, is who has got control of the air? Who has got control of the radio? I don't know whether you as an expert in this field realize how important that is?

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SEVAREID:

Well, maybe we are important. I understand you used to listen to our radio reports every morning before going to work?

MULLINS:

That's right.

SEVAREID:

Well now, Mr. Dallas---

MULLINS:

I listen to some others too. I don't want to [LAUGHTER]

SEVAREID:

Well we--they shall be nameless. They shall be nameless.

MULLINS:

[LAUGHTER] No, I listen to your eight o'clock and your eleven o'clock with great regularity and generally, you know--in the intelligence business, I know it well--generally you can scoop us.

SEVAREID:

This is a terrible thought, you know.

MULLINS:

Well, our messages have to be coded and decoded and so on

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DULLES CONTINUED:

and---so that the flash that you get---that you get on the air comes first. For example, when Stalin was stricken and the word came through. It came through first from radio. The Iraq coup came through first on radio. One or two things that intelligence has beaten the radio. If they impose silence, as they did at the time of the Trujillo business. You were off the air---no communications, so that the word of the shooting of Trujillo came---or bombing came through other channels long before you got it. I mean, you the press and radio.

REPHRASED:

Mr. Dallas, during the---your Swiss period in World War I it has been charged against you by some writers---I think a British M.F., that you were then working for the a surrender, or turnover rather, in Germany that would put Himmler and the generals in charge instead of Hitler, that you were then worrying about Soviet Russia as much as you were about what remained of the Nazi power. What about these stories?

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DULLES:

Well, these stories are mostly fabricated in Moscow. I had been put out in various ways by the Soviets, through Pravda, Tass, The New Times and other ways. There's one particular story now that they're spreading abroad. This English Parliamentarian did write a book including some of these things. I think he called it THE MASTER SPY. It was mostly an attack on me and the man in question-- is so far over to the left [that you don't know whether he's fallen over the edge or not.] This particular story to which I'm referring related to some conversations I had with a German--a man of German nationality named Max (Koenig?) who had had a large estate in the Sudetes which had been taken over. He traveled back and forth, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, from time to time and he had those conversations. Proved very useful to me. I got a great deal of information about the--how Himmler was thinking and how (Koenig?) was thinking and others and there were certain Gestapo reports of these conversations which weren't my reports. They were what the Gestapo said via (Koenig?) I had said. They had no relation to

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WOLLES CONTINUED:

---to the facts. Maybe it was what Hosenlaw wanted to tell them in order to please them. That's the way you get information often. You give the other fellow information that attracts him, that pleases him that isn't necessarily true. Maybe Hosenlaw did that, I don't know.

BEVANS:ID:

You were not advocating through your German friends, or to the American government that such a turnover would be preferable?

WOLLES:

for from it---

Oh no---oh no./I---I can say that as the war came to a close and as I became involved in the negotiations for the surrender in North Italy, the Russian opposition to these negotiations gave me a lot of pause and in the surroundings there in Switzerland, I met with a good many people who began to feel that the next great menace to freedom if the Nazi menace was met, would be the Soviet Communist menace.

BEVANS:ID:

You had company in Mr. [BULZER] Churchill about that too.

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MULLER:

---began to get some very good company on that theory and I never changed my---my views on it.

SEVAREID:

Were you saying sir, that the Russians were opposed to our attempt to get the surrender of the German troops in North Italy at that time?

MULLER:

They fought it in every way possible.

SEVAREID:

Why was that?

MULLER:

Well, I'll come to that. Can I just say a word---just when these negotiations started, I had to assume the responsibility of seeing a high German general, Lt. General Carl Volk, ^{who} [apparently is in some trouble on this anti-Nazi---on this Jewish situation---has been reassessed, I think. He, I know,] had been a Chief of Staff of Hitler. However, he was then very powerful in North Italy. One of the most powerful of the German Generals. He was a S.S. General. You know what S.S. is

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DULLES CONTINUED:

"....., the extreme Nazi. He, however, made overtures to us that he would like to negotiate with us for the surrender in North Italy, surrender of all the German divisions in North Italy. Well, I thought this was probably a fake and I said I was not in the negotiation business and I said---I took a flyer. I said, "Now, if you will release to me two leading hostages, Italian of hostages---the Italian underground whom you have, I'll talk to you. I'll see what you've got to say." I did this without any consultation and might have risked my official skin in it, but still [BUZZER] I thought I'd get some information out of it and I didn't think I'd be so dumb. To my great surprise, he---within three days, released these two men. One was F....., who later became Prime Minister of Italy for a short time and was one of the leaders of the Italian underground that was in a jail in Verona and the other was an intelligence officer who had been picked up and put into jail in Rome so he brought these people out and gave them to me. So I saw him and he then made these proposals that he would

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DULLIS CONTINUED:

organize a surrender of the twenty odd divisions that the Germans had, then still fighting pretty effectively in the Northern Apennines. That I reported to Washington and with some trepidation, I awaited the reply. Well, I got a favorable reply. I sent a copy of the message to Alexander---Field Marshall Alexander through our U.S.S. people in Italy and to Bill Donovan and Alexander said, 'Go ahead and I'll send up---I'll send up two people from my command to join you.' and he sent up a man named Lyman Lemnitzer you've probably heard of---

BEVAREID:

The present Chief of Staff.

DULLIS:

The present Chief of Staff---yes. And Terrance (Airy?) who was his G-2 and they were in Switzerland with me for about six weeks and these negotiations went on. Now right at the beginning, to show our good faith, Stalin was notified and he was notified of all that was being considered. It was an unconditional surrender of this particular contingent of German forces, just as the

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DULLES CONTINUED:

Russians had taken the surrender of the Germans at
Stalingrad and that there was no political connotations
of any kind whatsoever. Well, the Russians, in a long
series of correspondence, which now is available--the
Soviet tried to block this in every possible way. They
asked to send negotiators to Switzerland to join in the
conversations. Well, there weren't any conversations
to take place in Switzerland. They were to take place
in Italy and we told them that they could join in as
soon as the German plenipotentiaries went to Italy,
to Caserta, Alexander's--Field Marshal Alexander's
headquarters. They would be admitted. That didn't
satisfy them. They demanded that the negotiations
be stopped and the very last ~~unpublished~~ message that
President Roosevelt sent to Stalin before his death in
April, 1945, related to what they called the Barce incident.
Well, why was this? I think and I'm studying it as some
of the background of this now, that this was the situation.
The boundaries between East and West were fixed by
agreement up to the Curia frontier. That is, it didn't

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DULLES CONTINUED:

make any difference how far the military forces pushed forward. If they went over the boundary as we did in southern Germany in the Leipzig area, you may remember they would have to withdraw, because we had agreed with the Russians that the division---the dividing line of Germany. There was no line in the south. Did you ever notice that, remember that? There was no line or division, except at as to where the forces met.

SEVAREID:

In the thrust of what you're saying, Mr. Dulles, that if we had stopped where we were---the war had come to an end and we were still fighting in Italy, we might have had Russian power and influence in northern Italy today?

DULLES:

I---yes---yes. It might well have been in Trieste, or farther. In fact, as it was, with the early surrender on the second of May, which was a week before---about a week before the German surrender in the north, the American-British forces, as they moved forward after

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CPYRGHT

DULLES CONTINUED:

May 2, met Tito's forces in the streets of Trieste. It was that close.

SEVAREID:

Then it would have been Tito's forces, perhaps, not Russian forces?

DULLES:

Well, at that time---this was long before 1948---at that time, Tito was working closely with the Russians. As far as this is concerned, if his forces had been there, the Russians would have been with him, I think.

SEVAREID:

May I ask you sir about the Peenemunde V-2 rocket attack on the continent. that you had reported on from Switzerland. These things were to be aimed on London. Might have wiped out London completely. Many people have said you were responsible for really spotting the significance of this. The British say that some of their people were. What is your account of that affair? It was very critical.

DULLES:

The general time that you were referring to would be the

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DULLES CONTINUED:

Spring and early Summer of 1943. At that time, the Germans hard pressed, had various choices to make as to the---the miracle weapon. Do you remember the old days? It was a miracle weapon that was going to come that was going to save the war for the Germans in the last days? Well, they had to decide what would be the miracle weapon. I had been told and I can't confirm it, but I think it is very likely, that around this time, some of the leading German nuclear scientists and they were very far forward in the nuclear field, so you know---went to Hitler and explained the theory of the nuclear fission---fusion---maybe not fusion, fission and he turned to them and said, "How long will it take?" and they said, "Eighteen months." And he said, "Forget it. I haven't the time." Now, whether that is actually true, I don't know, but it is very likely to be true. His other weapons were for the (forward?). He had been working on a rocket and I got some word of this in June of 1943. I don't remember the exact date, but I remember it was in June. It was from a very creditable source,

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ROCKY, ROSSI EVEN

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EXCERPTS CONTINUED:

a man who could have known and it was to the effect that there was a rocket station on this sand island as it is, off the north of Germany in the Baltic there at Neustadt and that considerable work, launching pads and so forth were there. As with all information of that kind, I sent it forward to Washington with an information copy to London. I have never made any claims myself as regards priority. There's been a very interesting book written by a very able English girl---woman, who at the time was studying photography and you picked up the great skill of certain indices on some films that the British had taken when on a bombing mission to Stettin, which was just beyond and I don't know whether---which was correct or which was second, but this is one of the interesting types of experience one has in intelligence. You get information from two sources and if the sources are really separate, as these two sources were, it is almost a confirmation of the fact. Here was a girl looking at the film of a plane that had flown over there and taken pictures, as they were being taken all the time. Here

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DULLIES CONTINUED:

was a report that I received in Switzerland from an individual who was in a position to know what the Germans were doing. I think the reports were very similar in time, about the same time and putting two and two together you got adequate information so that the British went and bombed the place and I understand that did a good deal of damage and delayed the effective entering into operation, of the--of the V-1 and the V-2, because the Germans had the two weapons. The missile with wings, which they developed because of the difficulty they had with the--same thing we had difficulty with the re-entry problem. Michael They had not licked the re-entry problem at that time for the--their one hundred and fifty to hundred and seventy-five mile missile which is the fore-father, the grandfather of the I.C.B.M., the Atlas and the missile that the Russians have.

NEVAERTD:

What we called the V-2 in London, I think and it was ...

DULLIES:

You called it the V-2---I happened to be in London the

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DULLES CONTINUED:

Norman Davis and I made some trips to England, France, Italy, to talk with the leaders there in order to better prepare for the work we were doing in Geneva---the disarmament conference and we went to see Hitler.

DEWARDEID:

What was your impression of him?

DULLES:

Well, I never thought he would be the threat to the world that he was from the conversation we had with him that day. I had, of course, followed his career. I knew he was a dangerous---a dangerous man, but I never thought of him as a more sophisticated human being than---than...

DEWARDEID:

How do you mean?

DULLES:

Well, his presentation---I won't say it was inadequate but was ineffective. What Norman Davis was trying to get over was---this relatively simple idea, not very palatable to Hitler. He said, "In this disarmament conference, the rest of the world other than Germany

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BULLIES CONTINUED;

which has been disarmed by Versailles, is trying to reduce its arms to a much lower level. Now, don't you break through that level, because that then will make impossible what we're trying to do. Won't you be patient for a few years and we'll be down then to a level comparable to yours?" Well, he wouldn't buy it. But his argumentation was not very effective. There were two things about Hitler that I---I remember very well. He has extraordinary eyes. The lighting was such that it was hard to see, but they looked like dark, piercing eyes that snapped and he had the hands of a woman---small. His discourse, as I say, was unco-ordinated. There was one other amusing incident that I remember well. A man named (Kampstengel?)---you may recall his name---he had been educated in the United States and went to a pretty good university [BUZZER] and he was quite a favorite of Hitler. I don't think he ever was a Nazi though. He played the piano beautifully and Hitler loved music. He was there as translator and --- obviously he knew English and German well and Hitler

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DULLES CONTINUED:

made his opening statement to Mr. Davis, the American
reviving ambassador for Roosevelt and I knew German
quite well and I was astonished at the translation. It
had very little to do with what Norman Davis had said.
It was what (Hauptstengel?) thought Hitler should have
said and---so Norman Davis replied to what (Hauptstengel?)
had said and then that was translated back into German
and it wasn't quite what Norman Davis had said, so finally
I said to (Neurath?) the Foreign Minister who was sitting
there---I said, "Look here, this is impossible. Let's
get a new translator." and I suggested that he---he
translate the English into German, which was the more
difficult and I would translate the German into English.
So we went on that way and (Hauptstengel?) was dismissed
as translator. Later, he was supposed to have written
his memoirs, ^{you know} and let it be known that they were in the
vault of a Swiss bank and if anything happened to him,
they'd be published and he led a rather abnormal life in
Germany for a while, till he finally left.

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dallas, (Brenburg?) the Russian propagandist and writer, wrote a paragraph about you that I know you've read and he said, "If the spy Alan Dallas should arrive in Heaven through [BUZZER]---he would begin to blow up the clouds, mine the stars and slaughter the angels." Have you ever committed an act of violence in your life?

DALLAS:

No.

SEVAREID:

Has anything ever been attempted against you? You've traveled a good deal and you're rather precious about it. If you were running the----- (OVERTALK)

DALLAS:

I don't think so-----.

SEVAREID:

You've not been aware of being followed, or---

DALLAS:

Oh, followed--yes. I don't consider that an act of violence. The Communists--the Nazis had the reputation and I believe it was confirmed in one or two cases, but

OLD, ROSSI
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DULLES CONTINUED:

they wanted to move anybody about, they boxed them up and put them in an airplane. The Gestapo would hesitate to do that, but I never got boxed up and as far as I know, no effort was ever made. When I was in Switzerland [BUZZER] I was cautioned about---of course---not going near the frontier and preferably not going within a short distance of the frontier. It was pretty hard in Switzerland because the frontier's all around you and not very far away, but---no, I can't give you any---any stories that indicate I have committed an act of violence, or have been the victim of one.

SENWALD:

Aren't your travels for the rest of your life rather circumscribed? You tremendous cargo of memory, so busy about our secret affairs. Would you feel safe going to or Russia itself, even as a tourist?

DULLES:

Well, I don't know whether they would give me a visa. I applied for a visa in 1936 and I haven't had a reply yet so I don't think I would get a visa. I have no particular

WALKER ODD, ROSSIE EVID
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DULLES CONTINUED:

plans for that kind of travel at the moment.

DULLES:

Well, I was---I was in Switzerland in---in Germany. I was head of the C.S.S. detachment in Germany for six months after the end of the war---

SEWARD:

Yes.

DULLES:

---and at this time, I went up to Potsdam and Potsdam---
Seward's was, was the 20th of July. I was up in Potsdam on
the 20th of July, the anniversary of the Hitler business
in '45.permission for Stinson for the Japanese
---and---

DULLES:

Switzerland is a neutral country and they are quite
neutral, but they adhere to a policy of neutrality that
I think is of great benefit by and large to the free

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DULLES CONTINUED:

world. It's a neutrality that does not tolerate any interference. Now, they have laws as we have about the use of their soil in time of war for any unneutral acts. They enforce those laws. If I erred, they would pick up my people--but they know one thing. They know and I told them again and again that I have no interest in any Swiss military secrets. The stronger the Swiss are militarily, the better the free world likes it, because we know Switzerland is going to defend its freedoms and so--why yes, I had certain problems and I think you mentioned before if I was ever followed. There was somebody there a good deal of the time and I spoke to the Swiss about it and "Oh," they said, "Come here for your protection." "Well," I said, "I don't think I'm in any danger." "Well," they said, "We don't want to take any chance on this. We think we'd better have you here for your protection."

REVALEID:

Of course, the Russians and the Germans and the Italians were all operating out of there too?

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MILLES:

Oh yes and---but the Swiss were watching that operation very carefully and if they overstepped the bounds of ---of neutrality, they'd hear from them. The only difference there was---they couldn't really send me home because I couldn't get out of Switzerland. The Germans, of course, the German diplomat did something they didn't like, they could send him back to Germany or back to Italia. But what could they do with the Americans and the British? They couldn't send them home because they couldn't travel.

HOWARD:

I think you were there toward the end of the war with Japan. What was your role in that surrender? Toward

MILLES:

Toward the end of the war in the Far East and this was about the end of my period of service in Switzerland and by the way, when I was there in Switzerland, I was operating as a special assistant to the American Minister. He was a minister there. Leland Harrison, who was a very old friend of mine. We worked together in World War I

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DULLES CONTINUED:

and an outstanding American diplomat. Toward the end of the--of the war, word came through to us from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating for a surrender. By this time, the story of the Italian negotiations that I had described briefly, or the negotiations in Italy for the German surrender, were somewhat public property, because by that time, the surrender had gone through and the armistice had been signed and put into effect, so the Japanese said, "Well, this is the channel for us." so they turned to me on that and this story has been written up in the Japanese papers. At that time, in (Bern?) we had what was called the Bank for International Settlements, that was sort of the father of the International Bank that is here now. At that bank, or on the staff or that bank, throughout the entire war, there were nationals of warring countries. It was the only institution in the whole World War--no--during the war, where that--that happened. The League of Nations was out of business.

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DOLLES CONTINUED:

during the war, but at the Bank of International Settlements there were nationals of the United States, Britain, France Germany and Japan which was a very strange situation and the President of it, at that time, was an American (Yacketrick?) and he was the only American who could travel in and out of Switzerland at that time. I was, for years, for many years, I've been a great friend of (Mr. Pierre Jacobsen) who is now the head of the International Bank and a man for whom I have the highest respect, a financial wizard and the Japanese went to him, talked to him. He talked to me and they made quite interesting proposals and as a result of these proposals, I was asked to go up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met there with Stalin, you remember and first with Churchill and then Churchill lost his election and Atlee appeared. I took to Stimson, at that time, the proposal that had come through this channel with regard to an early Japanese surrender, provided the---the Emperor---the Mikado was kept, as a link to prevent disorders. I think they were afraid

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DULLES CONTINUED:

of what might happen. There might be complete chaos in government if there wasn't some symbol to the Japanese of a continuing order, not of a continuing war. I didn't know at that time, of a great many things which were---which were going on and I just gave that message and reported back to them that I had done so. That, to them---the Japanese in the Bank.

SEVAREID:

You did not know about the first atom bomb?

DULLES:

No---no.

SEVAREID:

Do you think that the dropping of that bomb was important in terms of bringing about the surrender?

DULLES:

Well, that---that's an awfully hard question to answer. I have the deepest respect for the man who made that decision. As a young man, I'd grown up under Stimson--- I'd worked under Stimson many, many times and I consider him a man of outstanding character and ability. President

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DULLES CONTINUED:

Truman is a man who is---I have the greatest respect for. There are few men who have been as consistent a friend of the Central Intelligence Agency in which he---he was a father of that himself, because it was put into effect during his term of the Presidency and I, therefore, hesitate to pass in judgment on that. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse and inability really effectively, to carry on the war.

SEVAREID:

They were closer to surrender than we officially knew.

DULLES:

They were closer to collapse. They were---their air force was virtually grounded. Their communications were disrupted. Their Navy had had to retire practically off the sea. The kamikazes were still going. A few little things---I wouldn't say little, but a few things of that kind, but I frankly feel that one of the major mistakes and hindsight is awfully easy, you know and I don't want to criticize those that were in power,

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DULLES CONTINUED:

in authority, but I think there was a major failure to appraise the extent of the (heat?) and the hopelessness of the struggle. Germany was then through as far as war was concerned. All of the power of the United States of Britain, was there---now, if you want to bring Russia in, that was added. They were fighting a hopeless battle. As I say, with an air force that was grounded and a navy that was practically off the seas---could hardly dare come out.

SEVAREID:

Do you think there might have been a chance the Japanese would have surrendered without an American invasion of Japan itself?

DULLES:

Yes, I do---I do. Whether the [BUZZER] persons with whom I was dealing were in good faith, or were authentic or not---I think they were in good faith, but they knew nothing about the bomb at this time and there were pretty serious peace feelers before knowledge of the bomb broke on the world.

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CPYRGHT

BEVAREID:

Would we have been wiser to let the Emperor stay?

BULLERS:

Well, we did.

BEVAREID:

We did?

BULLERS:

Eventually---the Emperor stayed---

---that was a decision that was made and I think Mr. Joseph ^{is} Drew, /as responsible as any human being for that being done. He had the same view---I didn't know it at the time---but he had much of the same information and he, as I recall, he felt very strongly that (you?) needed to keep the Emperor and I think all---I think the developments in Japan have been (aided?) with the fact that that was done.

END OF REEL 1 (tape)

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ERIC SEVAREID - ALLEN DULLES

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, you said that early in '45, you knew that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know that?

DULLES:

Well, at that time, and I may say, this has been disclosed. This isn't a new disclosure I'm making. I had access to information that was reaching the German Foreign office, which was smuggled out to me in Switzerland in the form of certain cables that the German Foreign office was receiving from various parts of the world. Among those cables were messages from the German ambassador in Tokyo, the German air attache and the German army attache. These cables showed that the situation of the Japanese Air Force and the plight of the Japanese Navy, by the end of '44 and early '45, was in a position, both in air and sea was becoming almost unworkable, far more than the public realized. Now, of course these messages were sent back here and were sent out to the Far East Command. I assumed they were valid.

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DULLES CONTINUING:

with all the rest of the intelligence received. Their source by this time had been authenticated, [so there wasn't any doubt in Washington that these were fakes.]

SEVAREKID:

Was this an occasional stray cable that we picked up, or was this a steady flow?

DULLES:

This was a steady flow that started in August of '43 and went on until about the end of the war---about April of 1945.

SEVAREKID:

Well, that suggests to me that we had informers in rather high places in Tokyo then.

DULLES:

No, these were innocent informers in the sense they sent messages in cipher from Tokyo to Berlin. It was in Berlin where the messages were picked up.

SEVAREKID:

That was your key place---your key people, then?

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DULLIES:

Yes.

SEVAREID:

How high---

DULLIES:

The fact that I had---that there was a man in the (State) foreign office who was sending out messages to me, had been---has been published.

SEVAREID:

For more than two years, than?

DULLIES:

About two years---August of '43 to a little less than two years. August of 1943 to roughly April of '45.

SEVAREID:

Well, is the---is the implication of what you're saying that we knew positively that the Japanese were in that condition, that we did not act upon that knowledge? That's the right inference, why didn't we---

DULLIES:

Well, I don't want to criticize others. All I can say is, there was intelligence, which, if it had been

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WILLES CONTINUED:

believed, would have led to that conclusion. I do not know what other intelligence was put into this pot of ^{over} other all intelligence that they had about the Japanese situation. There might have been high-level conflict intelligence, but certainly the--the views of the--the Germans who were allied with Japan as to the situation in the Japanese Air Force and Navy indicated that the situation was catastrophic as far as they were concerned---as far as the Japanese were concerned.

NEVAREKID:

Well, most of us would find it hard to understand from what you've said about this, why we encouraged Russia to enter the war against Japan at all.

WILLES:

Well, looking at it with the wisdom of hindsight, which is easy, I think that was a great mistake. I think, however, that they would have pushed themselves into the war if we hadn't invited them in. They would have crashed the gate even if the door had not been opened to them, so maybe the result would have been very much

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DULLES CONTINUING:

the same as now.

SEVAREID:

But they wouldn't have had the agreements with us about Sakhalin and other territories.

DULLES:

No, they would not have had the agreements as to the parallel---thirty-eighth parallel---wasn't it in Korea? And about a good many other occupation zones. They were in Port Arthur for a while and so forth and so on.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, I want to ask you what sounds like a silly question, but I've been told that you read spy thriller books for recreation. Is that true?

DULLES:

Yes---yes---

SEVAREID:

Do you ever learn anything from them?

DULLES:

I quite a lot of my friend Ian Fleming---Ian Fleming.

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SEVAREID:

Do you ever learn anything about the art of espionage from them?

WILKES:

Well, sometimes I think I do. I've taken his books. Then I've asked, in the days when I was the director of Central Intelligence, I said, "Would this gadget really work?" And I won't tell you the replies I get.

SEVAREID:

You mean, actually out of the imagination of a fiction writer, we have developed a technique---

WILKES:

Well, yes, but he's had some experience in the game. I don't know if you remember in one of his stories, he had a gadget. You put it in an automobile and then you got another automobile that can follow that automobile a couple of hundred miles and still trace it and all the turns and so forth and so on and I looked into that once, I remember.

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SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, I'd like to ask you what areas of the world you know best and in which are you weakest? You've talked about Europe. I know you were in the Middle East. Do you know Russia well personally? Do you know Latin America well?

DULLES:

I don't know Russia well from the point of view of having visited there in recent days. I have, of course, talked with everybody I could get my hands on who's been to Russia, the travelers, our official representatives---senators and so forth and try to get a clear view of what is going on there and I made a point of that when I was director of Central Intelligence. I made a point also of keeping in touch with the very good group of scholars we have here in the United States, the development of the study of Russian problems, in several or eight of our major universities. There's a very important development over the last years and I---I have found them of great help in their analysis of Russia. I have been to Latin America several times in

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DULLES CONTINUING:

the days of my practice of law. We used to have a law office in Buenos Aires---a branch office in Buenos Aires and I was---visited most of the Latin-American countries. To my great regret, I don't speak Spanish well. I can read it, but I don't speak it at all well and I---I've always regretted that. My mother was quite a Spanish scholar, because she lived in Spain and in Mexico with my grandfather, who was minister in those countries in the early days---by the way, my grandfather was minister to Russia back in the 1890's---no, before that---1880's.

SEVAREID:

Before he was Secretary of State?

DULLES:

Before he was Secretary of State in '92, yes.

SEVAREID:

Well, you had a grandfather Secretary of State, an uncle finally your own brother. Do you ever have any ambition to be Secretary yourself?

DULLES:

(Laughter) Never that I thought would be realized.

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SEVAREID:

I'd like to turn to this question of communism in this country, which I realize has not been the direct field of responsibility for C. I. A., but it still is something you've thought about a great deal and know a great deal about. How serious a matter is this? Is it confined just to Russian agents? Are there great numbers of our people that are truly dangerous?

DILLERS:

As you've indicated, Eric, communism in the United States the threat of it and the handling of it is a matter that was not within the---and is not within the ^{Compete} ~~conflict~~ of the Central Intelligence Agency.

SEVAREID:

Speaking as an individual, now---

DILLERS:

Yes, as an individual. But, I just want to add on that that naturally the---and I'm very glad to say this, the relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and J. Edgar Hoover were the very best, because quite naturally, there's important information that must be

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DULLES CONTINUING:

passed from one to the other, because international communism has no bounds, has no barriers in a sense that one will run across an agent---a Russian agent in a country in Europe who may later be posted to the United States and if the Central Intelligence Agency can identify him in Europe and trace him back, then if he should come to the United States, he becomes a problem for Mr. Hoover to handle, with his excellent organization. The problem of communism in the United States divides itself into a sort of series of compartments. There was a Communist Party of the United States that you've heard about and that the courts have taken certain measures against. That party, while numerically weak and weak in overall major leadership, still exists. That party sends representatives to the party congress, to Moscow, as you know, every time they have a party congress there, the American Communist Party there is represented---gets their orders and come back and then pass those orders on to the faithful. The Communist Party, as distinguished from what's happened in ^{Countries} Christ-like France, Italy and

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ABEL'S CONTINUING:

Some others, has never been able to gain a foothold in our political life. We have had a Marcantonio in the Congress, but by and large, we've had no---no communist influence in our Congress. They just can't get elected anywhere and generally they can't even get on the list. Now, of course they couldn't for other reasons. Generally they disguise themselves under other names so that they're not so distinguished. However, that's existent and Mr. Hoover's written about it and that's as far as that's concerned. Then, you have in the United States---you have, of course---as we learned in the Abel case---the public learned, but as been known for a long while, they send over agents here undercover agents. They're not (buzzer) associated with missions in this country and I'll just have to refer you to Hoover on that. Although the C. I. A. had an interesting part in the Abel case in that and this illustrates the cooperation that the C. I. A. and the P. B. I. have. The Soviet agent who disclosed and uncovered Abel was picked up abroad and was sent over by---through the instrumentality

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DULLES CONTINUING:

of the C. I. A.---was sent back to the United States and there turned state's evidence against Abel and disclosed the existence of the Abel network.

SEVAREID:

There was a time, was there not, when the F. B. I. was charged with foreign operations, too?

DULLES:

During the war, the F. B. I. had foreign operations in Latin America and the F. B. I. now have legal advisors abroad, but those legal advisors are there as a natural and proper element of the collection of information that relates to the prosecution of legal cases in the United States.

SEVAREID:

There used to be a story around the---

DULLES:

But there are very few of them---only a handful---

SEVAREID:

There used to be a story around Washington, Mr. Dulles that when a C. I. A. man and an F. B. I. man shook hands

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SEVAREID CONTINUING:

each went away counting his fingers.

FULLER:

(Laughter) I think that goes back to the (laughter) to the neanderthal days. That's not the---hasn't been the case for many, many years. We have---in the past---we have had among the ranks of the C. I. A. members, a great many people who had their initial training with the F. B. I.---(buzzer)

and they have been a real help to us. It's been a (inaudible) of experience that's been of great use to the agency.

SEVAREID:

Now, in the matter of communists in this country, Mr. Nixon said the other day that though there are only one thousand members of the Communist Party in this country approximately, that is as if the C. I. A. had ten thousand Russians working for us inside Russia. Is this a fair equation at all? Aren't many of the communists in this country youngsters and otherwise amateurs in terms of

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SEVAREID CONTINUING:

intelligence work?

DILLIES:

Well, I would not think it was correct to say that all of the members of the Communist Party in the United States were acting as agents. Most of them wouldn't be qualified to act as agents and a bad agent is much worse than no agent, so that they would not try---they would not try to use all the members of the Communist Party in anything like an agent, or an information-collecting capacity, because they just wouldn't be any good at it.

SEVAREID:

Well, I---

DILLIAS:

I might add (excuse me).

SEVAREID:

Go ahead, please.

DILLIES:

Just to sort of finish up on the sort of communist influence in the United States, there's one area where

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DULLES CONTINUING:

the communist have made inroads that disturbs me a good deal and maybe I'm getting a little person^Q here, because I've been on the receiving end of---of this activity. They have started rumors through the broad mechanism they have, of Tass, of Pravda, Izvestia, the New Times, all the outlets they have, because they control a good many papers in Europe, the Far East; I've forgotten what's happened to the Daily Worker. It appears once a week, doesn't it, now, or something of that kind?

SEVAREID:

I believe so.

DULLES:

---but it's of no consequence, but they have outlets that do not bear the label "communist" all over them. That they're fellow traveler---that are on a very tight fringe. Let me give an example now, if I may. You will recall that the C. I. A. was attacked some time back for having encouraged the generals' revolt against De Gaulle in Algiers. General Challe particularly and that then became widely spread in the United States in wholly

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DOLLETS CONTINUING:

reputable journals and true reputable channels through which--where there was no taint of communism. Although they had originally appeared in other types of publications. Well, when ⁹he was director, we made a study that and I think the results have either been---been available to the Congress. I think they've been published, but one of the very first appearances of that rumor was in a little Italian sheet called (The Peace)---name that paper. It was then picked up by some French journalist. Then was widely spread. It got into a sort of a---sort of temper of the times, you know. Then got, as I say, got spread in the United States and believed by a lot of people, that it's now being repeated in books that are coming out about the C. I. A. at the present time and that you can trace back directly to the communist propaganda machine and I could cite you some of these recent publications about the C. I. A. a dozen of instances of that kind, of where they have spread stories that are utterly false and through various channels that they have and through repetition---some

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DULLES CONTINUING:

these stories go back to '48. This one about---that you mentioned before, about my alleged attempt to negotiate to bring about negotiations for a separate peace and so forth and so on with Himmler. These have been spread and spread---they repeat them and repeat them. I think one of the things that we forget in our propaganda. We say a thing once and we think, "That's it." The Russians will say it a hundred times if they want to get it spread and they'll keep pushing it and pushing it, and finally somebody will pick it up. Generally a left-wing journal. Generally a journal abroad and then it gets repeated over here and that---in that way, they are having a far more influence in this country than anybody realizes.

REMARKS:

The story of C. I. A. agents supposedly encouraging the revolting French generals was apparently encouraged, or at least believed, by some French government officials at very high level. How do you account for that?

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DULLES:

Well, I don't know whether they really believed it, but it might have been convenient at that time not to deny it.

SEVAREID:

Well---this means that the C. I. A. has become a kind of a political football---whipping boy and a diplomatic scapegoat. You're no longer directing it, but how do you look at this? This cannot be a matter of any happiness to you. How do you get the C. I. A. back in its proper place and out of these politics?

DULLES:

Well, you must remember that I'm retired at the present time as far as the C. I. A. is concerned. I have been acting from time to time, at Mr. McGone's request, as a consultant, but what I'm saying today here to you is--- I'm saying as a private citizen and not as a---an official of the government and naturally having been a director of the C. I. A. so long, I---I have the deepest interest. I've given ten years of my life to this work to try to build up the C. I. A. and anything that hurt

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BULLET CONTINUING;

it deeply affects me and I feel very deeply concerned about this (spade?), but any time a revolution happens anywhere, the Soviet will begin by saying the C. I. A. did it. Now, if that's believed, that's bad. I have collected---over the years I was there as director. I collected literally thousands of---of items of Soviet propoganda, just along these lines and now books are being published that say that we got rid of Farouk in Egypt---probably was a good thing if one had done it. We didn't we put in Nasser, which we didn't do. That we've done all kinds of things in various parts of the world and it's---it's hard to deal with it. You just say it's not true, but here it appears. It's repeated in books that seem to come from reputable sources. I don't know. I think maybe you can give me some good advice as to what I could do as an individual, because I know these things aren't true.

REMARKS:

Have there been no cases at all where C. I. A. people have advocated or pushed a line of diplomatic policy as

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SEVAREKD CONTINUING:

to whether this government or the next one was desirable in our interests in a foreign country?

WILLES:

I don't believe there is a single case where that has been done where it has not been done with the approval of the appropriate policy-making official of the government. That is the Department of State, subject to the President.

SEVAREKD:

But surely you and some of your top people in your days in the C. I. A. have strong personal feelings from time to time as to what our foreign policy should be in relation to a given government, or situation, did you not?

WILLES:

Certainly, yes.

SEVAREKD:

You were not merely providing information?

WILLES:

Well, as members of---as members of C. I. A., we had no business whatever advocating a line of policy. We were

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DULLES CONTINUING:

perfectly entitled to prepare estimates about a given situation and in such an estimate, we might reach certain conclusions as to what was likely to happen, that a Syngman Rhee was likely to fall because of corruption in an election, or that there might be a change in the-- in the Turkish government for this or that reasons, but, it was never our duty to say what the United States government should do about that. That was a decision that had to be reached at the level of policy and then if, in connection with that policy, there was anything that the C. I. A. should do, we did it.

NEVAREID:

Well, Mr. Dulles---

DULLES:

---within our capabilities.

NEVAREID:

---for a long time, in this government, your older brother was Secretary of State and you had a great many meetings with him dealing with information of intelligence affairs. Wouldn't it be a fair inference, that

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BEVARKID CONTINUING:

since you were his brother, that he would give an und
or at least, be prejudice in favor of your information
perhaps over that of his own diplomatic arm from time
time?

WILLYS:

(Laughter) I don't know. It might be just the oppos
You can't tell. (Laughter) I do not think that he--
did so. I'll be perfectly frank to admit that because
of the personal relationship, I would see him more oft
than if he had been a man who wasn't related to me, be
cause we would---we would do things together in the
limited amount of time he had---the very limited amount
of time he had, for outside activities and the somewhat
limited amount of time I had and we didn't always see
He had strong feelings and sometimes I had strong
feelings. On our busy philosophy of life and openness
to the world---yes, we agreed, but every once in a while
we would have disagreements, too.

BEVARKID:

Would it be possible for you to give me any specific

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SEVAREID CONTINUING:

indication of what some of those disagreements might have been?

DOLLES:

Oh, I think I'd rather not. I think I'd rather not. don't---

SEVAREID:

I assume---

DOLLES:

They weren't of very---of very serious nature. I remember times, even in the national security council, we would have differences, but it didn't go, as I say, to the basic fundamentals of our philosophy and I don't know of any policy situation where the position that G. I. A. took would have impinged upon, or changed, the policy he had and the same was true under Harter and under Rust and under Dean Acheson when he was Secretary of State. The idea that the G. I. A. has a policy of its own and makes policy is---I can assure you, with all the sincerity that I can muster. I can assure you that is not true.

MR. OGD, ROSSI EVEN

CPYRGHT

SEVAREID:

But hasn't it been true in some situations abroad, that
C. I. A. people have been (inaudible) on this happening,
a change of government, for example, and equipped with
lots of money and able to put into effect the kind of
change that our diplomatic arm would be less able to do.
As you know, you've been---

BULLIES:

That's greatly exaggerated. I mean, we're accused in
every election of having gone in and done a lot of
things. Our basic objective is communism.. If there's
a serious threat that a communist is going to take over,
we may have certain actions that we can take to make it
more difficult, because after all, that man who's going
in, is backed by all the strength of the Kremlin and all
the money of the Kremlin and everything that the Kremlin
can do. Are we to stand there helpless, do nothing at
all? It goes to a very (buzzer) basic (inaudible) point.
I realize that it is a very difficult---a very difficult
question, but how can we deal with the communist sub-
versive activities, which don't appear above the surface.

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DULLES CONTINUED:

without a counterattack? Are we going to allow them around the world to go ahead, not only in their overt to sending overt actions, as in Southern Vietnam, with guerrilla warfare and so forth, but by all the other techniques. Khrushchev features wars of liberation. Now, what does he mean by "war of liberation"? He doesn't only mean that the colonialists should be driven out, but he means that in any country where that proposes to---to turn a country from a free-enterprise country to a communist country can be backed, that group will be backed. Are we to stand there and not help our friends at all? I just raise that question.

SEYARRED:

Are you saying, Mr. Dulles, that in no cases---(but) abroad where the activities of C. I. A. have conflicted with our official State Department foreign policy in those countries?

DULLES:

There have been none.

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BACK ODD, ROSSI EVERYRIGHT

BEVAREED:

None at all?

MULLER:

None at all.

BEVAREED:

Sometimes abroad, our diplomatic representatives have indicated considerable irritation with C. I. A. activities in their area.

MULLER:

That's correct.

BEVAREED:

What is the chief source of that irritation?

MULLER:

The chief source of that irritation probably is because they are---felt that the action that C. I. A. was taking was not in agreement necessarily of their own views, but it was in agreement with the State Department's views. There have been cases where a diplomat in a foreign country has looked at the picture somewhat differently than it has been looked at in Washington. (Buzzer.)

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WALK ODD, ROSSI EYES

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SEVAREKID:

Is it true that rather recently President Kennedy felt obliged to send letters to all of our ambassadors, saying that they will control everybody and all activities connected with their territory abroad?

DALLAS:

It was very similar to a letter that Eisenhower wrote.

SEVAREKID:

What did it have to be done again if there were not to lines of action sometimes between C. I. A. and---

DALLAS:

Well, that applied also, of course, to U. S. I. A., I. C. A. and everybody else.

SEVAREKID:

I'd heard it said at one or two embassies, by diplomats that one of the difficulties was that C. I. A. men were apt to stay in the country longer---a longer term of office than a normal foreign service diplomatic official that therefore they would come to have greater knowledge more contacts and they thought, an undue influence in the workings of an embassy in the carrying out of our policy.

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DULLES:

Everything you say there but the last is good, isn't it
In a sense.

SKVAREID:

Is it good?

DULLES:

Well, I mean, that they may stay longer, know more about
the country, have more contacts. These are all pluses,
aren't they?

SKVAREID:

You would argue then that the foreign service people
ought to stay longer than they normally do?

DULLES:

Well, I think that is for the foreign service to decide
and many other considerations that---that come in. When
you have a political change, there are changes in the
foreign service and in many of the top positions under
the foreign service so much as in the top position, which
from the point of C. I. A. would not have to be made.
because political changes do not affect our own work, so
that you have, in addition to the normal change, after a

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DULLES CONTINUING:

period of rotation---you have in the foreign service as regards to the chiefs of missions, you have political factors that enter in to cut short the terms of many whereas that does not happen in the C. I. A.

SEVAREID:

It's in a sense a mere professional arm of government then?

DULLES:

Well, it's a---a non-political arm of government. No political pressure is ever brought on me when I was director of C. I. A. to appoint somebody, or to remove somebody and I don't know. I never asked the political of any single member. I don't know, or I didn't know the politics when I was director. I didn't know the politics of---of any of our men. Never asked it---on any forms. I didn't care whether they were Republicans, Democrats, just so they weren't fellow travelers or fascists.

SEVAREID:

One of the new books about the C. I. A. makes the claim

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SEVAREID CONTINUING:

that your people in Iran, at the time of Mossadeq, spent literally millions of dollars buying up people to riot the streets and so on to try to get rid of him. Is there anything you can say about that?

BULLES:

Well, I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false.

SEVAREID:

There's been a general argument in the left, or liberal press writers in this country---

BULLES:

Yes---

SEVAREID:

---that the C. I. A. people have sort of automatically tended to support very extreme right-wing groups in foreign countries because of an obsession with communism and have therefore set back progressive democratic possibilities in foreign countries.

BULLES:

I think just the opposite is the case. If you go over situation like the situation in Korea and many others

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DULLES CONTINUING:

could cite---we're getting into rather difficult lines there. I would say that by and large, we were quicker than others to recognize the dangers in these situations and when I was in---when I was in the U. S. S., I worked to establish a very close relationship with international labor organizations and the socialists and I think my own personal relationships to the leaders of the socialist parties in Europe is probably as close as anybody's and this is an utter fantasy, because I have often felt that many countries that the strongest antagonists of the---of the communists and those who knew them best were often---not always, but often---some of the socialist leaders.

SEVAREKID:

Mr. Dulles, to get back for a moment to the question of communism in this country, there is a great argument on the part of the people who are called extreme right wing---perhaps they are---perhaps they're not---that you can get communism here by a process of what they call "creeping socialism," by extending the welfare activities of

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SEVAREID CONTINUING:

government and so on. Has communism ever come to any country that way? Do you think there's any prospect of it arriving here by that avenue?

DULLES:

Well, I don't think there's very much prospect of it's arriving here by that avenue and I don't think by that avenue, it has made very much progress elsewhere in the world. As I was saying, that there are many places where those who support government ownership are at the same time very strongly anti-communists. I don't myself believe in--in the theory of government ownership, except in certain recognized areas, but to answer your question, I was trying to think of the countries around the world where there was been a large degree of government ownership. Take India, for example there's been no appreciable gain in communism there and I--I feel that one must recognize that the situation between private ownership and government ownership has to be somewhat difficult in some of these emerging states in the early stages--some of the new states.

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SEVAREID:

Make a sharp differentiation between what we call socialism and communism?

DULLES:

Well, there is a very sharp distinction between socialism and communism. They often use socialism to talk about the socialism world and---and the socialist state, but they use it in a very different way than the leaders of what are known as the socialist parties of Europe or the---particularly of Europe use it. You take the leaders of

SEVAREID:

..... of Belgium?

DULLES:

---of Belgium. He has been one of the most vocal and active---among the anti-communist leaders. [You take Molle in France and we've got a good little problem in Italy now, but the socialists who have advocated, as in England---the labor party, who have advocated government ownership---most of them have been pretty strongly anti communist.

*Somebody
Mention here
[unclear]
out*

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SEVAREID:

Many people ask us---because many people in this country tend to link the two together all the time---socialism and communism and was trying to get from you some kind of sharp differentiation or definition of exactly what communism is---this thing that we really fear.

DULLES:

Communism is a very different thing than they say it is. Of course, if we had had started to define what communism is, we'd be here all night. There's so many things one can---can say about it. What are they---what is their definition? From each according to his ability and to each according to his needs---that's the final end as they see it, of communism. Everybody works for everybody else and eventually, under their theory, even governments will fade away, because you won't need a government, because I don't quite see it, but still---not at the present time, they recognize that they---they, I mean Khrushchev and company, recognize that they have not reached anything like that and in his last---one of his last speeches, he said that it might take twenty years.

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DULLES CONTINUES:

It will probably take nearer two thousand years, but still---let's say twenty years. That's what he predile about ten years to reach the United States in economic production---gross national product---then years he says he will not achieve. Then, another ten years to reach this utopian state, where everybody works for everybody else and governments become of secondary importance. Maybe today they've reached the stage where they claim they have, that from each according to his ability, to each according to his labor, which is more nearly the capitalist system, in fact, because we're going to pay our income taxes every April fifteen and when you get through with that, you think it---you give according to your ability and maybe a little bit beyond that to the state, but still---

UNRECORDED:

Well, Mr. Dulles, there are those, as you know, that think we will drift generally in their direction, in terms of governmental control everywhere in the society and that they may drift a little ways in our direction

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SEVARKID CONTINUING:

in terms of more liberalized economic and political, intellectual life. Do you see this happening?

DILLES:

Well, there are going to be evolutions. What is called the capitalist system has gone through great changes in the last fifty years and more since the industrial revolution and the hundred and more years since Marx wrote his "Das Kapital" and certainly, we have---in that period moved toward more government control and more government responsibility for the individual and all our---our measures for relief. Now, they have moved to some extent, under Khrushchev, to do away with certain of the elements of terror that existed in the Soviet system. Their economic theories have not changed too very much, although Khrushchev has introduced a sort of decentralization in industry that he felt would lead to more efficiency. Well, what of the basic difference between the two societies? Have all, it's the question of freedom of the individual?

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ODD, ROSSI EVEN

CPYRGHT

SEVAREID:

This is in Russia, still a dictatorship of a special (inaudible).

DULLES:

Still a dictatorship and while the individual has less of the terror, he has very little more of the freedom. If he says something that the government doesn't like, that doesn't mean necessarily today that he goes to Siberia, but he may lose his job. If he's a top fellow like Molotov, he is discarded. If he's a Milenkov and doesn't agree, he goes off somewhere to central Asia and disappears from sight. Well, that's maybe a little less cruel than disappearing under the ground.

SEVAREID:

It's not a rule of law as we understand it?

DULLES:

Not a rule of law--where there are any human freedoms and that is the--is the basic--the basic difference between this and I have a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they (buzzer) learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world,

K ODD, ROSSI EVEN
CPYRGHT

DOLLER CONTINUING:

are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom. They'll want to hear your radio and see your television. They'll want to learn what goes on in the rest of the world. They'll begin to see the---the basic falsity of the whole history of Russia. They're having a terrible time now in getting out their histories. I was reading their history of Russia. What do you say about Stalin? Twenty-five years of what they recognize now---or they claim now, was a reign of terror and they've been re-writing the great encyclopedia of Russia---the Encyclopedia Britannica---I mean---corresponds to that a little bit and as I recall, I don't remember the exact figures, they had about twenty-four pages on Stalin in the last edition. Now in---they're coming to the "STA" volume and it didn't appear. Months went by. The other volumes began to come out, but this was the gap there. They were trying to work over---what were they going to say about Stalin? What are they going to do with the twenty-four pages? You know what they did with the pages on Beria? They wrote an article

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DULLES CONTINUED:

on the Bering Straits and they had to talk for three
four pages on the Bering Straits in order to fill up
gap and they sent out extra pages to the holders of
encyclopedia.

SEVAREID:

Instead of Beria of the Secret Police fellow?

DULLES:

The Secret Police fellow who was eliminated after---
after Khrushchev disappeared, because he was trying
take over the government.

SEVAREID:

He was banished from Russia?

DULLES:

---A man when Stalin disappeared.

SEVAREID:

So he just vanished from Russia and history, then?

DULLES:

Oh, he's vanished from Russia and history entirely.
They couldn't---(buzzer) banish Khrushchev---I mean
Stalin. Twenty-five years of hell. Twenty-five years

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ADD, ROSSI EVAN

CPYRGHT

DULLES CONTINUING:

the great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech of Khrushchev's---denied Stalin, but they never dared let that speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and they are to go back to the attack now---that was the Twentieth Party Congress---but the Twenty-second Party Congress, they had to go back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.

SEVAREID:

Didn't your agency get ahold of that speech originally?

DULLES:

I won't deny the charge.

SEVAREID:

My understanding at the time was that it came through your people and was published in the West as a result of the efforts of your people. You---

DULLES:

Yea---

SEVAREID:

---willing to stand guilty of this charge, are you?

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BACK ONE, RUSSIAN OVERSIGHT

DULLES:

I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev charged me with it at one time. You'll find it in---in one of his statements back two or three years ago.

SKVARKID:

Well, you have to rank that rather high among your accomplishments.

DULLES:

I think it was one of the really important---important accomplishments. The speech was given out by the State Department after the State Department had subjected it to the most careful scrutiny and study to be sure that it was accurate and it's never been---it has never really been challenged and has been accepted now. You are undoubtedly various copies of the speech---copies that were some of the speech as given and then the speech as circulated to the faithful in the various parties around the world, but the essentials are there and they can't challenge the essentials of that speech as being what Stalin said to the Twentieth Party Congress in '56---(oh, yes, excuse me.)

ODD, ROSSI ^{CRYPHT} ~~EVEN~~

DULLES CONTINUING:

It can't be challenged that what Khrushchev gave to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, was his view of what Stalin had meant to Russia and what Stalin had done to Russia and the dangers with which Stalin faced the Russian people. In addition to all of the purges and disappearances for which Khrushchev held Stalin accountable.

SEVARKID:

I've heard it said, Mr. Dulles, that Stalin was easier for us to understand as a person than Khrushchev is.

DULLES:

That may be true. Stalin---at Potsdam, at Yalta---the of the Berlin blockade---was carrying on a policy that was understandable in a sense except that throughout, dealing with the Soviet, we had a great difficulty of understanding---of getting a common understanding of the meaning of words---peace, democracy---simple words. I---I find it hard to answer that question of yours, really. Both have done a great---good many unexpected

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DOLLER CONTINUING:

things. Stalin, during the war, in his work with our military leaders, seemed to generally carry out agreements, but he wouldn't enter into a lot of agreements. Remember the "shuttle"? When our bombers were going over Germany and they should have been able to refuel in Russia. That was not allowed, but his position was fairly clear on it. He didn't want us to be in there, seeing what was going on and he took that measure against it. At the time the Russians stood on the Vistula and left the Nazis and Poles kill each other in Warsaw---well, that was his way of eliminating his Polish enemies.

NEVAREID:

Speaking of that area, of that period, have you any doubts about who killed all those Polish officers in the Katyn Forest? The Russians blamed on the Germans and vice versa.

WILLIAMS:

I have no doubt myself, and I think the evidence clearly points to the fact that the Russians did it. Now,

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DULLES CONTINUING:

obviously there are many people that were slaughtered--- many Polish officers and others slaughtered by the Germans, but the particular Katyn matter---all the evidence I have seen points to the fact that that was a Russian operation---Soviet operation.

SEVAREKID:

Mr. Dulles, during the last war when you were in Switzerland, you used to see Dr. Karl Jung, the great psychiatrist, and talk about how the Germans and Mr. Hitler would act and react to certain things from a psychological point of view. Do we make any progress, or even any attempt to do that from hearing about a man like Khrushchev? Any long-range psychoanalysis?

DULLES:

I remember my mentioning that to you some time ago--- that is, my relations with Dr. Karl Jung. He was living then, near Zurich, near the Lake of Zurich and I did see him very often and I found his judgments as to what a man like Hitler, who was an introvert. I believe---I'm not a psychologist---would do, as compared, as to what

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Mussolini, who was an extreme--extremist would do. At that time, I was talking to him--we were getting to the end of the war and one of the questions I was interested was, "Would Hitler hold up in the mountains. You know, in the famous but non-existent redoubt? Or on the war indefinitely? Or would he commit suicide or what would he do? Jung was very, very good on that. Also very good on many other--other matters. As of the present time, yes, there's quite a lot of study being made of Khrushchev's actions and reactions. Myself, somewhat of a disciple of Pavlov, as an interpreter of what Khrushchev does--when you take certain of his actions--his actions in brutally ca of the conference in Paris in May of 19--40--59-- he knew all the time. He had known what the U-2 flights were doing. He had known about the U-2 flights who was here talking with Eisenhower and--so that all page and so forth and so on--that was fabricated. wanted to destroy the conference and he took that m of doing it. His actions at the--at the U. N. who

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DULLES CONTINUING:

took off his shoe and beat the table and certain of his other actions there.

SEVAREKID:

You mean that is deliberate political propoganda tact

DULLES:

I believe they were and I believe that---as I say, there is a little Pavlov---you remember the theory of Pavlov---that if you train a dog to respond to three bells---you open the door and you ring three bells and give him sugar and then you do that for a month. Then all of a sudden you open the door and the three bells and instead of sugar, you beat him over the back with a stick. The dog is puzzled. The dog doesn't know what happened and you vary this business and so forth and pretty soon, the dog has gone pretty well crazy. Eventually, it reduces the animal and perhaps the human being---(overtalk).

SEVAREKID:

Does a human being react? That is the reason we spend all our time trying to decide what does Khrushchev do

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~~SEVAREKID~~

Today, it's co-existence and everybody and then the next day it's something else. I think this sort of thing--- and take the---take the stopping of the test ban--- breaking of the test ban---starting to test. What date does he choose for that? He could choose among days--- he chooses the day of the opening of the unaligned nations conference at Belgrade. Now, I think if your late colleague Ed Murrow had been considering that matter, he would have advised the President not to break the test ban on the day that the United Nations meets in New York. I think that would be bad psychology--- wouldn't it?

SEVAREKID:

But Khrushchev would do it the other way?

HILLARY:

But Khrushchev thinks, this is the thing. This shows I am strong. This shows I don't worry what you unaligned nations are going to decide here, or do here. I'm going to test. I knew you're going to protest, so protest.

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ODD, POSSI EVEN
CPYRGHT

SEVAREID:

Well, under the Pavlovian theory---an experiment as I remember it, the animal---and we think now of human beings and read the papers and listen to the radio---in place of the animal---is reduced eventually to confusion and finally to apathy. Is that the theory?

WILLES:

Apathy or insanity---(inaudible).

SEVAREID:

Do you really think they act out of this concept of human psychology?

WILLES:

Well, there are a lot of differences of opinion on that. But it seems to me that Pavlov has had a certain amount of influence on Khrushchev and that Khrushchev thinks there is mileage to be gained by the shock treatment. We apply the shock treatment in medicine. Sometimes it does somebody some good. I think Khrushchev feels he gets---gets mileage out of it, particularly with the---with the nations that are---with the weaker nations. If you know, the United States, over the years rightly and

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DELL

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DELLER CONTINUING:

I'm very glad to say that it has, has gained the reputation of a certain respectability in its international relations and we are held to a much higher standard of conduct than a lot of other nations and that's---in a sense, that's an almost---an embarrassment they expect us always to live up to this high---a high code. That we'll never do anything that will be resented, or disliked by any other country. Khrushchev way down here. He is looked upon---I won't use the naughty word over the television. He is looked upon as---you know what I mean. Therefore, if he does something nice, which seems a very little thing, he gets a great deal of kudos. If, on the other hand, we don't do what pleases every country, then we get blamed.

SEVAREKID:

The prodigal son got far more attention than us?

DELLER:

Ninety-nine is the one---one repentant.

SEVAREKID:

Well, now, we attempted to build trust in us among oth

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CPYRGHT

SEVARKID:

countries and governments.

DULLES:

Quite right.

SEVARKID:

But supposing Khrushchev, by his threatening and bullying tactics, persuade the governments of the world or most of them, that his government, not ours, will finally decide the issue of peace and war in this world (will that not give him an enormous political (buzzer)).

DULLES:

Yes. I think it will and I think there's something of that creeping into the relationship at the present time.

SEVARKID:

In other words---

DULLES:

They're afraid of Khrushchev and being afraid of him. They---if they're in a situation of peril. These (I mean?) the Soviet Union, they intend to curry favor with him. They aren't afraid of the United States. Does an

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BACK QED, ROSSI EVER

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DULLES CONTINUES:

country think the United States is going to invade them, or going to do anything of that kind? I don't think so, except possibly Russia and I don't think that they really take that seriously.

SEVAREID:

But it's in the nature of things, is it not, that neutral countries, India or Yugoslavia, or what not, would put their pressure against the side that is open to reason and persuasion, which is us, rather than against which is not open to it and therefore, we get the brunt of the complaints, or the advice from the small neutral countries?

DULLES:

That's correct. That's correct and I think that's shown up these days when we have the negotiations on the test ban, it was really a brutal operation that the Soviets put on. No warning. Here was a--sure, it was a gentleman's agreement that had been reached between the three countries, but to--to break that without any warning and have all your preparation set so that you

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CPYRGHT

DULLES CONTINUES:

announce the break in one day and then the next day
shoot off your first bomb.

SEVAREID:

I would like to break here---

DULLES:

For example, in May of 1960, you recall that Khrushchev
brutally broke off the conference in Paris with President
Eisenhower and Macmillan and the French, at a time when
he had known for years that the U-2 was flying and yet
he used this as an excuse in a truly Pavlovian manner
to brutally terminate a conference he'd agreed to go
and which he was already attending.